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O P I N I O N 
____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Defendant-Appellant Pressler and Pressler, LLP appeals the District Court’s order 
granting Plaintiff Bock’s motion for summary judgment.  Bock alleged that Pressler and 
Pressler made a false or misleading representation in violation of the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, by filing a state complaint without 
meaningful attorney review.  Although the issue of Article III standing was not raised by 
the District Court or by the parties, “we are required to raise issues of standing sua sponte 
if such issues exist.”  Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 134 n.4 (3d Cir. 2001).  At the 
time of oral argument in this case, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), was 
pending before the United States Supreme Court.  It had the potential to impact cases like 
Bock’s, when the alleged injury to the plaintiff flows from the violation of a procedural 
right granted by statute.  We asked the parties to address Spokeo at oral argument and 
requested written briefing after the opinion was published on May 16, 2016.1 
 The issue of standing is “an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-
controversy requirement of Article III.”  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 
(1992).  “The doctrine developed in our case law to ensure that federal courts do not 
                                              
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise de novo review over an order 
granting summary judgment.  Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 2002).  
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exceed their authority as it has been traditionally understood.”  Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 
1547.  Constitutional standing requires the party invoking jurisdiction to meet three 
elements: 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a 
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) 
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical[.] Second, there must be 
a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of . . . . 
Third, it must be likely . . . that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.  
 
Lujan, 504 U.S. 560–61 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  The issue 
presented in Spokeo was whether the violation of a procedural right granted by statute 
presents an injury sufficient to constitute an “injury-in-fact” and satisfy the “‘[f]irst and 
foremost’ of standing’s three elements.”  Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. 
 While the Supreme Court did not change the rule for establishing standing in 
Spokeo, it used strong language indicating that a thorough discussion of concreteness is 
necessary in order for a court to determine whether there has been an injury-in-fact.  Id. at 
1545.  The Court made it clear that the requirements of particularization and concreteness 
required separate analyses and that neither requirement alone was sufficient.  Id. at 1548 
(“Particularization is necessary to establish injury in fact, but it is not sufficient. An 
injury in fact must also be ‘concrete.’”).  In determining whether there is a concrete 
injury, the presentation of an alleged statutory violation is not always sufficient.  Id. at 
1549 (“[Plaintiff] could not, for example, allege a bare procedural violation, divorced 
from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.”).  
However, the Court confirmed that “because Congress is well positioned to identify 
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intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements . . . . [it] may elevat[e] to 
the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously 
inadequate in law.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Essentially, “the question 
framed by [the Court’s] discussion [is] whether the particular procedural violations 
alleged in [a] case entail a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness 
requirement.”  Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550.   
 We recently discussed Spokeo’s impact on Article III standing in In re 
Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., No. 15-1441, 2016 WL 3513782 (3d Cir. June 27, 
2016).  There, we interpreted Spokeo to say that “even certain kinds of ‘intangible’ harms 
can be ‘concrete’ for purposes of Article III . . . . What a plaintiff cannot do . . . is treat a 
‘bare procedural violation . . . [that] may result in no harm’ as an Article III injury-in-
fact.”  Id. at *7 (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550).  We observed that “in some cases an 
injury-in-fact may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of 
which creates standing.”  Nickelodeon, 2016 WL 3513782 at *6.  Specifically, we 
addressed the Supreme Court’s deference to Congress, noting that “Spokeo directs us to 
consider whether an alleged injury-in-fact ‘has traditionally been regarded as providing a 
basis for lawsuit,’” and “Congress’s judgment on such matters is . . . ‘instructive and 
important.’”  Id. at *7 (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549). 
 Given the Supreme Court’s directive in Spokeo regarding the need for a court to 
specifically address concreteness and particularization, we will remand this case to the 
District Court to determine in the first instance whether Bock has Article III standing.   
